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INTRODUCTION 
The public transport reform discussion initiated in 1992 in the Netherlands ended in 2000 
with the enactment of a new passenger transport law. According to this new law, about a third 
of public transport services will have to be tendered by regional authorities in the coming 
years. In the meantime, a few regional railway lines have been contracted or tendered and 
preparations are made to tender for the operations of a number of regional and urban bus net-
works across the country. It is scheduled that after this first period, Parliament will review the 
effects and decide whether the new legislation will be extended to all public transport ser-
vices. 
After presenting the main elements of the reform path and some achievements to date, this 
paper will review two current cases of competitive tendering and compare these practices with 
the reform aims. One of the main aims of the reform was to introduce a clear distinction be-
tween authorities and operators whereby authorities would retain control on the transport 
policy while operators would gain a larger control on service design. The analysis of cases 
will show that reality remains at a substantial distance from this ideal. In the paper we will 
discuss reasons that may lead to this situation and that should be taken into account in the 
further implementation path and later reforms in the context of the future evaluation by Par-
liament. 
THE DUTCH REFORM OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
Dutch public transport is currently subject to fundamental reforms. This is true for both local 
and regional transport (buses, trams and metros), on which we will focus in this paper, and for 
the railways, on which we will spend only a few words. In this chapter, we will briefly de-
scribe the historical public transport regime in the Netherlands before presenting the main 
features of the newly enacted Passenger Transport Act 2000. 
 
* The opinions presented in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Ministry of Trans-
port and Water Management. 
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Historical regime and developments up to 2000 
Local and regional public transport in the Netherlands was historically based upon the princi-
ple of market initiative but moved de facto gradually away from that principle, giving a great 
degree of stability to incumbent operators, which were mostly authority-owned. 
The 1988 Passenger Transport Act was meant to simplify the regulatory framework (limited 
deregulation), to better integrate services and give more control on the growing deficits. A 
lump-sum subsidisation regime was implemented while the nation-wide ticket and fare inte-
gration introduced in 1980 was maintained. The subsidisation was rather complex and often 
fine-tuned by the Ministry. It moved from a supply norm base, to a passenger-km base and 
finally a passenger revenue base but it was crippled with exceptions and time lags that weak-
ened its incentive power. Regional transport companies, owned by the state or local authori-
ties, were amalgamated into one large group before being split again and for some parts priva-
tised in order to generate competitors for the pending tendering regime. Autonomous entry by 
private operators, while still legally possible, hardly ever took place in practice. 
It has to be noted that two experiences with competitive tendering took place in 1994. This 
resulted in the entry of an American operator on a few rural routes in the south of the Nether-
lands. This operator proved able to provide, roughly speaking, about 30% more services for 
the same amount of subsidy as the incumbent (van de Velde, 1995). Although measurements 
diverge according to the source, a substantial increase in passenger number was also 
achieved. 
The Passenger Transport Act 2000 
This Passenger Transport Act 2000 marks the end of a public transport reform discussion that 
started in the early nineties with the recognition that public transport was at a loss in the com-
petition with the car (evolution since 1950 shows a declining public transport market share 
while maintaining ridership). The origin of the act is a report published by a Committee ap-
pointed by the Minister of Transport (Commissie Brokx Openbaar Vervoer, 1995) that called 
for a decentralisation of tasks and powers from central government to provincial and regional 
authorities, for the introduction of tendering and for putting authority-owned local transport 
companies at arm’s length. These recommendations were based upon the perception that the 
existing unchallenged monopolies were working inefficiently and took too little account of 
the wishes of their customers. As a result, public transport did not provide a competitive ser-
vice compared to the car, which was and still is a main policy concern. Competition by ten-
dering at the regional level was then seen as an incentive that should be introduced to change 
this situation. 
From the first of January 2001 the Passenger Transport Act 2000 forms the new legal basis 
for public transport by bus, tramway or metro in the Netherlands. It is also partly applicable to 
public transport by train and is the keystone in a process of redistribution of tasks and powers 
among central government and local and regional authorities, of introduction of competition 
and of redrawing the relationship between transport operators and local and regional authori-
ties. 
The objectives of this whole process, and therefore of the Passenger Transport Act 2000, are 
twofold. In the first place it aims at creating conditions to improve public transport services’ 
attractiveness such as to lead to an increased usage of public transport especially in areas 
worst hit by congestion. In the second place it aims at achieving a higher cost recovery ratio 
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by decreasing the subsidisation rate from, roughly, two-third of the full costs of public trans-
port in the past to 50% in the future. 
To attain these objectives the law decentralises powers and aims at a clear distinction between 
authorities and operators. Decentral authorities would retain the control on transport policy 
and therefore define public transport services on a strategic level. The decentralisation is 
based on the idea that local authorities are in a better position than the Ministry to draw local 
public transport policies (while municipal authorities were already responsible for local trans-
port, interurban transport was decentralised in 1 January 1998 and many regional train ser-
vices will be decentralised during the coming years). Operators, on the other hand, would 
retain control on the tactical and operational level1 and therefore gain control over service 
design. The philosophy behind this distinction is based on the idea that an operator has a bet-
ter knowledge of the preferences of (potential) passengers and must therefore have all instru-
ments in hand to adjust services to meet these preferences. It is also believed that production 
costs will sink when operators are enabled to organise services according to their own visions 
while respecting guidelines set by authorities at the strategic level to fulfil their public duties. 
The Passenger Transport Act 2000 introduces a radical change to the existing regime by in-
troducing a regime of authority initiative2 whereby service provision will, ultimately, be dele-
gated to (private) operators selected according to competitive tendering. Under the old law 
operators could introduce new services. These could only be rejected by the authorities when 
the proposals were deemed not to meet the public interest or deemed to be against the finan-
cial interest of the authority. The Passenger Transport Act 2000, on the contrary, prescribes 
that an operator requires a concession initiated and granted by the authority before being al-
lowed to start new activities on the public transport market. It thereby gives the authorities a 
firmer grip on public transport. The two key-elements of the new act are the system of con-
cessions and the possibility/obligation to put concessions out for tender. 
• Concessions 
A concession is a kind of public service contract that gives an operator a temporary exclusive 
right to provide public transport services in a specific area or on a specific transport link. The 
operator who has obtained a concession is obliged to carry it out. Under certain conditions, 
two (or more) operators could operate in the same area, for instance when separate conces-
sions for bus and tram services are issued for a same area. The law states that a concession is 
required before being allowed to provide public transport services. However, transport opera-
tors may upon their request and under certain circumstances be allowed to operate without 
concession, i.e. enter the market upon their free decision and without first being submitted to 
a call-for-tender. Such request to the contracting authorities may only be refused when the 
services suggested excessively compete with the existing concessions. 
Concessions are granted by regional (provinces, metropolitan areas) or local (municipalities) 
authorities; there are in total 35 competent authorities (although there are discussions ongoing 
tot reduce this number). The area to which a concession applies may, in principle, extend no 
further than the boundaries of the province, municipality or metropolitan area issuing it. As 
passengers will frequently travel through more than one concession, the act requires authori-
ties to include provisions for service harmonisation across concession boundaries. If this is 
 
1 See van de Velde (1999) for a further description of the strategic, tactical and operational levels. 
2 See van de Velde (1999) for a further presentation of the concepts of market initiative and authority initiative. 
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not achieved, the Minister of Transport may issue an order to remedy the situation, either on 
his own initiative or at the request of one of the authorities involved. 
The authorities may decide on the length of the concessions, subject to a maximum of six 
years. However, exemptions from the six year maximum can be granted by the Minister of 
Transport for concessions for tram, metro or other guided systems when the concessionaire is 
required to make sizeable investment in rolling stock or when sizeable investments in infra-
structure have to be made. 
The law stipulates that each concession must contain rules on the involvement of consumer 
organisations, the information to be provided by the operator for monitoring purposes, audit-
ing, accessibility requirements for disabled passengers, safety of both passengers and staff and 
procedural rules on fares and timetable setting. The authorities may set additional rules. 
In the past, the Minister of Transport set nationwide fares. With the new act, local and re-
gional authorities may introduce regional tickets and fares. The Minister will, however, at 
first continue to set the price of nationwide through-tickets that have to be accepted by all 
operators. The ultimate aim is to introduce a single smart-card system by 2002 that will func-
tion as a support for all regional fares across the country. 
• Tendering 
The Passengers Transport Act 2000 enables authorities to put concessions out for tender. This 
is however, for the time being, not an obligation. When authorities choose to use a tendering 
procedure, the act requires them to draw up a schedule of requirements that has to be met by 
bidding operators. The authorities are required to consult consumer organisations about this 
document. Once the procedure has started the authority must follow the rules set by Directive 
92/50/EEC relating to the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public service con-
tracts. 
The competitive tendering of concessions will be subject to an evaluation by Parliament in 
2004. The evaluation will focus on changes in numbers of passengers, quality and costs. In 
order to make this evaluation possible the law stipulates that from the first of January 2003 at 
least 35% of the public transport services (defined in terms of turnover) must have been put 
out for tender. If this quota is not met by this deadline, the Minister of Transport may order 
the authorities to take the necessary action. The act determines that, depending on the out-
come of this evaluation, the legislator will then decide whether competitive tendering will be 
made compulsory from 2006 on (2007 for municipal transport services as it is felt that mu-
nicipal authorities require extra time to privatise their transport companies). 
A political wish was that the introduction of tendering would not lead to socially unacceptable 
situations in the labour market. The Passenger Transport Act 2000 therefore protects employ-
ees’ rights. Employees directly involved in transport provision (e.g. bus drivers) transfer to 
the new concession holder if their employer loses the concession, employees not directly in-
volved in transport operations transfer to the new concession holder proportionately to the 
size of the concession. Existing labour agreements and conditions of employment continue to 
apply to staff transferring to a new employer. These provisions are valid for a period of ten 
year. In the meantime, employers and trade unions will continue to negotiate labour agree-
ments and conditions of employment could change according to the usual consultation proce-
dures. 
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In order to introduce tendering in urban areas, municipally-owned providers will have to be 
made independent from their authority. While privatisation is not made compulsory by the 
new act, a requirement of independence between contracting parties is expected to lead to 
privatisation. Furthermore, to prevent unfair competition, municipal transport companies will 
not be allowed bid on other markets unless their own market is also subject to competition 
and they will be required to transfer all activities other than public transport services to inde-
pendent companies. Besides this principle of national reciprocity, the principle of interna-
tional reciprocity has also been introduced in the act. Companies based in other countries are 
rejected from tendering unless their own market is also subject to competition. 
As the urban and regional transport markets have been closed for a long time, a specific pol-
icy has been developed to favour entry by new providers and prevent any provider from gain-
ing a dominant position. Therefore the Competitive Trading Act has been applied to public 
transport and the Netherlands Competition Authority will ensure that providers do not abuse 
dominant positions and it may prevent the formation of cartels through mergers, take-overs, 
joint ventures and the like. In response to the Authority’s findings, the Minister may decide to 
put in operation a number of sections of the act such as to restrict providers’ dominance. 
The railway reform 
The reform of the Dutch railways is made up of two main phases. The 1995 reform led to a 
first step in the separation of infrastructure and operations. The 2000 reform is now leading to 
further steps toward contractualisation and tendering of railway services3. We will focus here 
on those developments that are most relevant for local and regional passenger transport. 
The 1995 reform involved a reorganization of the national railway company Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen (NS) and a substantial deregulation. The reform was implemented by a transi-
tional contract for 1996-2000. 
Competition also appeared during this period, though not exactly as planned; free competition 
‘on the tracks’, as took place during the ‘Lovers Experiment’ between Amsterdam and Haar-
lem, has now been rejected (except for freight transport). In the eastern part of the Nether-
lands, the state-owned regional bus operator won the right to operate a short railway line by 
competitive tendering. NS started a joint venture (Syntus) with that operator and a subsidiary 
of the SNCF Group to operate an integrated bus-train network and was granted by the same 
province a further contract without competition. A similar development was seen in the north 
where NS co-operates with Arriva (a British operator who bought part of the national bus 
company) in a joint-venture called NoordNed. Later this joint-venture won a competitive ten-
der for a local train network in a neighbouring province. It is expected that further bus-train 
integrations will appear in the near future. A further major competitive tendering case is that 
of the currently conducted triple tendering of infrastructure design, capacity provision and 
transport for the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Brussels high-speed line (to be connected to the ex-
isting Brussels-Paris line in 2005). 
The 2000 reform of the railway sector is based upon a policy document (Ministerie van 
Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1999) that was published by the new Labour Minister of Transport. It 
considers that it is better to let the existing main-line network find its new equilibrium without 
competition. NS will therefore be granted a 10-year concession to operate the whole main-line 
 
3 See van de Velde [, 2000 #7751 for further details on this whole reform process. 
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network but this will be subject to contractual performance obligations with financial incen-
tives. This should give NS more management freedom while allowing the Ministry to set 
clearer targets for socially necessary services and transport policy aims than was the case until 
now. As far as local railway lines are concerned, the reform involves a transfer of the respon-
sibility for the local lines to regional transport authorities and a gradual transition from nego-
tiated contracts to competitive tendering by provincial governments. The concessioning and 
tendering regime would be the one developed for local and regional passenger transport in the 
Passenger Transport Act 2000. The policy document also plans to evaluate the results after a 
few years before deciding on further steps. 
CASE STUDIES 
In this chapter we will present two cases of urban networks that are either about to grant a 
concession on the basis of competitive tendering (Leeuwarden) or that are well advanced in a 
process leading them to competitive tendering in the near future (Amersfoort). We have cho-
sen these two cities such as to illustrate the variety of approaches in location of the service 
design function permitted by the new Passenger Transport Act 2000.  
Leeuwarden 
Leeuwarden (Ljouwert) is a city of about 90.000 inhabitants on an area of about 84 km2 (in-
cluding a large rural area). It is the capital of the province of Fryslân in the North of the Neth-
erlands. The current public transport network is operated by Arriva (the British owned private 
operator, after privatisation of the Northern part of the national bus company VSN) on the 
basis of a traditional negotiated contract. It counts 11 lines and generates about 16 million 
passenger-km per year. The city is submitted to the regulatory regime of the Ministry of 
Transport whereby subsidies granted to the city are linked to the passenger revenue by public 
transport operations in the area. The City of Leeuwarden is the transport authority for the city. 
The level of cost coverage currently amounts to a mere 27%.  
The city has started a competitive tendering procedure in January 2001. This is the first ten-
dering procedure in the Netherlands according to the provisions of the new Passenger Trans-
port Act 2000. Furthermore an additional demand-responsive system is also tendered simulta-
neously (this is essentially a mobility-impaired transport system that has the particularity of 
being open to all passengers). The winning bid will be announced during the summer of 2001. 
Operations is due to start in January 2002. 
According to a policy document of the municipality, the process leading to tendering aims at 
improving service quality, improving efficiency and using the knowledge and creativity of 
potential operators. The municipality began with the development of a new bus network 
based on a differentiation of services into a faster ‘star’-like network and a slower underlying 
network providing closer services to neighbourhoods. Leeuwarden has deliberately chosen to 
keep the service design as a prerogative of the authority. The city has fixed routes, stops, 
minimum frequencies, periods of service, etc. The national fare system remains valid and 
determines an upper limit to the fare variations that could be suggested by the operator. It 
should however be noted that the municipality has chosen for a regime where all fare initia-
tives by the operator have to be approved by the municipality before implementation. This 
new network, which represents a lower level of service compared to the current network, is 
the base case on which operators have to bid. Besides this a number of options for additional 
services have been defined. These include well-defined improvements to the frequency, peri-
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ods of service and services areas or a lengthening of the contract period from 4+1+1 to 6 
years, but operators can also suggest own variations. A contract price has to be delivered for 
both the base case and the options. The winning bid will be mainly determined on the basis of 
the highest level of service that can be provided while remaining within the limits of the pub-
lic transport budget. This budget represents 94% of the national subsidy given to Leeuwarden 
by the State. Most of the remaining 6% will be used to form a bonus fund to be paid to the 
operator when specific ridership increase targets are realised. All passenger revenues accrue 
to the operator who carries all revenue risk after receiving the lump sum subsidy. Leeuwarden 
also included a penalty regime linked to the inadequate or missing delivery of operational and 
financial information by the operator to the authority. 
The contractual content, i.e. the ‘concession’, has strangely enough not been determined nor 
sketched before tendering. This will have to take place after choosing the winning bid. It re-
mains to be seen whether this process will be easy to fulfil. 
Amersfoort 
Amersfoort is a city of about 126.000 inhabitants on an area of about 64 km2 located about 15 
km to the Northeast of the main city of Utrecht. The current public transport network is oper-
ated by Connexxion (the nationally owned regional public transport operator) on the basis of 
a traditional negotiated contract. It counts 13 lines and generates about 14 million passenger-
km per year. The city is submitted to the regulatory regime of the Ministry of Transport 
whereby subsidies granted to the city are linked to the passenger revenue by public transport 
operations in the area. The City of Amersfoort is the transport authority for the city. This 
status was threatened by the low level of cost-coverage in the city, which would have led to 
the transfer of the transport authority status to the Province in the new regime. However, a 
specific plan to improve cost coverage led to an agreement to maintain the independent au-
thority status of the city. The level of cost coverage currently amounts to 31%.  
The city has decided to start a competitive tendering procedure during 2001 to grant the con-
cession for the whole of its urban passenger transport services. This decision is not based on 
dissatisfaction with the current operator, but rather on a desire to further improve transport 
services. The city had already tried to implement tendering in 1998 – as one of the first in the 
Netherlands – but difficulties linked to the delayed enactment of the Passenger Transport Act 
2000 led to a postponement of this intention. A plan to grant two concessions simultaneously, 
one for the regular urban services and one for demand-responsive services, has also been 
shelved. The demand responsive system will now be integrated in the provincial demand re-
sponsive system and that may be tendered at a different date. A final choice of operator for 
the urban services is currently expected by January 2002, while the starting date of the new 
concession is expected to coincide with the railway timetable change of December 2002. 
The example of Amersfoort is currently unique in the Netherlands in that it is the first city 
aiming to transfer substantial service planning powers (tactical level) to the operator. The 
municipality expects that this will lead to an optimised transport network. The schedule of 
requirements, to be included in the call for tender, is currently being developed. For this rea-
son, little can be said at this moment about the details of the procedure. However, it is ex-
pected that it will contain the main policy aims of the recently adopted Municipal Transport 
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Plan.4 Let us review the main features of the 1998 tendering intention as they illustrate the 
general philosophy adopted by Amersfoort and as they are broadly compatible with the spirit 
of the new Passenger Transport Act 2000. 
The 1998 intention was to include, amongst others, minimum service requirements in dimen-
sions such as minimum frequencies (varied according to periods of the day and week), maxi-
mum walking distance to bus stops from every house (e.g. 400 m), servicing of a specified list 
bus stops at main places in the city, connections to intercity train services to Utrecht and Am-
sterdam, and a maximum bus age of 8 years. The concession would have been granted to the 
operator suggesting the economically most attractive bid, fulfilling all service requirements as 
weighed by a multi-criteria table included in appendix to the schedule of requirements. This 
table also included the financial part, calculated as price per bus-km and price per bus-hour 
such that the resulting score could be used to select the winning operator. The operator would 
receive the national subsidy minus a specific amount set aside for a public transport fund. He 
would have had to carry all revenue risk after receiving this amount. However, a rather mar-
ginal bonus scheme linked to increases in passenger was added. 
BARRIERS 
The two examples presented illustrate the scope of variation given to transport authorities 
when developing concession-tendering regimes. While much more variation is feasible, it 
remains to be seen whether transport authorities will dare to venture on these grounds, which 
were created on purpose by the new Passenger Transport Act 2000. The examples to date, 
such as Leeuwarden but also the tendering of the regional railway lines in the Province of 
Groningen (a case that was not presented here), illustrate the high level of restraint exhibited 
by authorities, keeping most parts of service design (tactical level) in their own hands. While 
Amersfoort seems to be perseverant in trying to delegate service design to the operator (even 
here, suggestions have to be submitted to authority approval), it is too soon, though, to draw 
general conclusions as most authorities are still in a policy development phase. In the rest of 
this section, we will present possible sources of barriers to the realisation of the original aims 
of the Passenger Transport Act 2000 and fill in a few elements identified in the cases de-
scribed. Numerous features may create barriers to the realisation of the original aims behind 
the Passenger Transport Act 2000. We attempt at classifying these barriers in Table 1. 
 
4 Such integral transport plan, delineating policy aims on urban mobility by all modes is a requirement of the 
National Planning Act 1998. 
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Table 1 Barriers to delegating service design to the operator in a context of competitive tendering 
Important remark: This table contains possible barriers to implementing one of the main ideas of the Passenger Transport Act 2000, i.e. delegating the determination of passenger 
service design to the operator in a context of competitive tendering (we call this idea ‘delegation’ in this table for space and clarity reasons). The barriers mentioned here, though 
plausible, are solely provided as examples. They that do not necessarily exist at this moment in the Netherlands. Further research is needed to validate or invalidate the presence of 
these barriers. 
 Å     Objective barriers     Æ Å     Subjective barriers     Æ 
 
FACTUAL 
Impossibility 
INFORMATIONAL 
Lack of knowledge 
BEHAVIOURAL 
Psychology of actors 
LEVELS 
Each level leaves 
more or less 
freedom to the 
next one 
Barriers due to objectively identifiable feature in 
laws, regulations, governance or contract, which 
makes delegation illegal, impossible or not worka-
ble 
Barriers due to lack of information for actor(s) 
concerning the regime, its possibilities or lack of 
information on the market 
Barriers due to subjectively determined features in 
the behaviour of involved actors. 
Remark: these barriers are reinforced by the pres-
ence of factual and informational barriers 
1 Customs, 
traditions 
- - Competitive tendering is considered as opposed to 
general business ethics 
2.1 Legal regime 
The laws to 
which public 
transport is 
submitted 
Regime design flaw or frustrating element in the 
law (e.g. the law makes delegation inadvertently 
impossible, the law chooses for a tendering proce-
dure that frustrates the appearance of delegation, 
the law makes some desirable forms of contracts 
illegal,…) 
Authorities do not know which and how much 
flexibilities are offered by the law (e.g. in term of 
choice of tendering procedures, choice of contract 
content,…) 
Authorities do not understand the law 
Authorities are against the delegation idea alto-
gether. 
Authorities consider central government should 
continue to be responsible. 
2.2 Regulatory 
regime 
The general 
rules, that are 
decided within 
the scope of the 
law 
Regime design flaw or frustrating element in the 
regulations (e.g. the regulations make delegation 
inadvertently impossible, the regulations choose for 
a tendering procedure that frustrates the appearance 
of delegation, the regulations make some desirable 
forms of contracts impossible,…) 
Subsidisation and tarification (NTS) regimes render 
delegation difficult to implement due to resulting 
uncertainties 
Authorities do not know which and how much 
flexibilities are offered by the regulations 
Authorities do not understand the regulations 
Authorities do not want to engage in negotiations 
with government to solve problems 
 10
 
FACTUAL 
Impossibility 
INFORMATIONAL 
Lack of knowledge 
BEHAVIOURAL 
Psychology of actors 
3 Governance 
The choice of 
organisational 
form by transport 
authorities within 
the scope of the 
existing laws and 
regulations 
Internal administrative procedures chosen by (lo-
cal) authorities make delegation impossible 
Authorities do not know how to create clever or-
ganisational forms within the scope provided by the 
law and additional regulations 
Authorities are afraid of potential political conse-
quences of delegation when public opinion or the 
press reacts negatively to actions by operators 
Authorities (politicians and/or civil servants) want 
to keep all powers for themselves (hobbyism) 
Complexity issues in local decision making (inter-
twined policy domains such as town planning and 
social policy) 
Past experiences of delegation or competitive 
tendering that failed 
4 Contract 
The choice of 
incentives in 
(contractual) 
relations between 
authorities and 
operators, within 
the scope of the 
chosen organisa-
tional form 
Choice of contractual incentives that render all 
delegation features in the contract ineffective (or no 
incentives at all) 
Lack of skilled potential operators to carry out 
delegation 
Authorities do not know how to write good incen-
tivising contracts 
Authorities do not know how to attract potentially 
‘good’ operators to their call-for-tenders 
Operators do not have good information on market 
potentials 
Authorities and/or operators are excessively risk 
averse 
Misconceptions about the motives and behaviour of 
the other actor in the principal-agent relationship 
created by public transport contracts 
Untrustworthy partners in past contractual relation-
ships 
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We distinguish in Table 1 between a number of levels, using a concept from the economics of 
institutions (Williamson, 2000) where each level determines more or less the scope left at next 
level. As we analyse a recent and deliberate change at the legal level, we mainly focus on the 
‘hierarchical’ relation between this level and the lower levels. We do not consider at this time 
the dynamics and feed-backs that may appear in the longer term. We distinguish between 
what we call the ‘legal’ and the ‘regulatory’ level as we feel this distinction is potentially 
relevant to discuss barriers in public transport reforms. Laws are typically more stable and 
more difficult to reform than additional regulations enacted by government. Governance per-
tains here to specific choice in terms of what we call ‘organisational forms’, i.e. decision as to 
the parts of public transport provision that will be contracted out. The fourth level refers to 
decisions on contractual content, especially incentives, between authority and operator. 
We also distinguish three columns in a continuum, varying from the more ‘objective’ barriers 
to the more ‘subjective’ barriers, which we name ‘factual’, ‘informational’ and ‘behavioural’. 
• Factual barriers 
By ‘factual’ barriers we mean those barriers that are due to objectively identifiable features in 
the public transport regime making the realisation of its aims difficult, unlikely or illusory. 
Examples of such barriers could be (see also Table 1): 
• At the legal and/or regulatory level: the choice for an excessive procedural strictness in 
tendering may, under certain conditions, impose frustrating restriction to the tendering au-
thorities when letting contracts. France, e.g., has chosen for allowing negotiated proce-
dures in public transport tendering involving substantial revenue risks for the operator 
while the Netherlands have chosen to avoid such procedures as much as possible. This 
choice is to some extent based on differences in customs and traditions. 
• At the regulatory level: the choice of a specific subsidisation regime may hamper some 
developments in terms of tendering of service design. The national subsidisation regime to 
which Dutch transport authorities are submitted is an important peculiarity of the Dutch 
regime. Local and regional authorities receive a public transport budget from the national 
governments on a year by year basis. This future budget is linked to future public transport 
performance in the area. This creates uncertainties as to the future subsidisation budget 
available, which may be frustrating when tendering contracts for several years. This means 
that, on the one hand – and contrary to what is usual in many other countries – the amount 
of subsidisation available to public transport at the local level is neither freely determined 
by the local authority nor can it simply be budgeted for a whole contract period. On the 
other hand, this yearly subsidy grant from central government cannot be spent on anything 
else than public transport. This feature of the Dutch regime has already been responsible 
for a substantial amount of discussions between central government and candidate tender-
ing authorities. Leeuwarden reached an agreement with the Ministry, while Amersfoort re-
jected the compromise. It has up till now lead authorities to a tendering regime whereby 
the amount of subsidy is to a large extent fixed at the current level and where selection 
takes place on the basis of the level and quality of service that can be offered for that 
amount of subsidy. It remains unclear, however, how these uncertainties will affect con-
tract incentives. Problems may, e.g., appear if national subsidisation was to be reduced 
while service levels were contractually fixed at the local level.  
• At the regulatory level still: the Dutch national ticketing system continues to impose an 
absolute limit to the fares policy of operators. Freedom to reduce fares can be given to op-
erators, but this is not always done, furthermore fare changes are often subject to prior ap-
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proval by the transport authority. It is strange to observe that operators are asked to carry 
revenue risk and are submitted to passenger increase bonuses while being deprived from 
one of the most effective revenue management tools. Here too, future will tell whether 
what appears to be a barrier to effective delegation effectively hampers its functioning or 
not. 
• At the contractual level: a choice for an inefficient risk and instrument allocation between 
contract partners may lead to too expensive contracts and to a situation where the freedoms 
given to the operators remain unutilised, a lack of adequately skilled operators may frus-
trate the realisation of the aims of the reform,… 
• Informational barriers 
By ‘informational’ barriers we mean barriers resulting from a lack of information available to 
actors concerning the regime and its potentialities. Examples of such barriers could be (see 
also Table 1) a lack of information at the level of tendering authorities on the exact content 
and possibilities offered by the new legal framework, by the additional regulations, but also a 
lack of information on potentially effective organisational forms and contracts that are feasi-
ble with the enacted regime, or about the specific effects of some incentive regimes. The Cen-
tre for Innovation in Public Transport is one of the instruments designed in the context of the 
legal reform to avoid such barriers by providing information and guidance to local authorities 
in the process of competitive tendering. But in some cases it will be practice that will reveal 
the properties of the developed approaches. Experience will provide the required information. 
• Behavioural barriers 
By ‘behavioural’ barriers we mean barriers resulting from subjective features in the behaviour 
of involved actors, this is linked to the psychology of actors. This third type of barrier often 
dominates public debate. It should be noted that this type of barrier is actually reinforced by 
the presence of hidden factual and informational barriers that we want to distinguish here 
between the ‘purer’ behavioural barriers. Examples of such barriers could be (see also Table 
1): 
• At the legal and regulatory level: a simple rejection of the new regime by some authorities. 
This can be a simple (political) opposition to the idea of competition or a rejection of the 
idea of tendering because it is imposed by the national legislator to regional authorities 
who would have preferred a freedom of choice. 
• At the governance level: an opposition to the delegation of the service design powers to 
the operator in fear for potential political consequences when events that are, strictly 
speaking, compatible with the contract are nevertheless perceived by the public opinion or 
– worse – the press as undesirable. Some decision makers are then likely to buy a less un-
certain future public transport service in order to avoid political risks, even when this en-
tails the loss of possibilities for desirable innovation or performance improvements. 
• At the governance level: The complexity of local decision making when several policy 
domains are intertwined, such as town planning and transport or social policy and trans-
port, is sometimes seen by local decision makers as a reason for requiring full, direct and 
continuous control on the design of public transport services. This barrier is not necessar-
ily linked to the rejection of the contractual and tendering instrument per se, but rather to a 
belief in the importance of the ability to amend public transport services at any moment 
due to evolving decisions in related policy fields. 
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• At the governance and contractual level: Authorities may nourish doubts in their own abil-
ity to use contracting and tendering properly, this can sometimes be due to disappointing 
experiences with tendering in the past (failed competitive tendering for one reason or an-
other, or untrustworthy partners in past contractual relationships). The actors involved may 
be subject to misconceptions about the motives and behaviour of the other actor in the 
principal-agent relationship created by public transport contracts. Some authorities (both 
politicians and/or civil servants) may simply want to retain all control on public transport 
in order to use it as a ‘toy’. While this is fortunately often only a caricature, this eventual-
ity should however not be neglected.  
This list of barriers is by no means complete, neither is it an adequate representation of the 
current situation in the Netherlands. It is essentially an illustration of possible barriers to im-
plementing one of the main ideas of the Passenger Transport Act 2000, i.e. delegating the 
determination of passenger service design to the operator in a context of competitive tender-
ing. The barriers mentioned here, though plausible, are solely provided as examples. Further 
research is needed to validate or invalidate the presence of these barriers in particular cases. 
While we have mainly focussed on the positioning of the service design function with the 
coming contractual relations resulting from competitive tendering in the Netherlands. Further 
study should also focus on the (reasons for the lack of) local policy background behind some 
of the tactical decisions included in the tendering cases that are currently being developed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The new Passenger Transport Act 200 is based upon ambitious aims. It is particular in its aim 
to transfer a substantial part of service design to operator. Many transport authorities are cur-
rently developing competitive tendering plans, most adopt different approaches.  This paper 
briefly reviews the cases of Leeuwarden and Amersfoort. While this diversity enriches the 
scope of experiments and the potential sources of lessons, it also reduces the transparency of 
the market for potential entrants. 
Further developments in the implementation of tendering in the Netherlands under the new 
Passenger Transport Act 2000 will illustrate whether and which of the barriers suggested here 
really represent obstacles to the realisation of the aims of the legislator. Further analysis in the 
close future – when more authorities will have implemented competitive tendering of conces-
sions – will enable to distillate eventual regime flaws and practical instruments that can be 
designed to alleviate barriers. Besides this, comparative performance analysis of competi-
tively tendered networks with non-competitively contracted networks will provide informa-
tion on the effectiveness of the competitive tendering instrument in the context of the Dutch 
reform aims. We think the approach suggested here may help to clarify the dimensions of the 
discussion. 
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